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We examine econometrically the real effects of paper money's introduction into colonial New England
over the 1703-1749 period. Departing from earlier analyses that focus primarily on the depreciation
of paper money in the region, we show that expansion of the money stock promoted growth in modern
sector activity and not the other way around. We also find that bills emitted for seigniorage purposes
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In the hundred years that followed its founding in 1620, New England was transformed
from a small subsistence farming collective to the commercial hub of the New World. The
rise of trade and commerce in the region was consistent with the pursuit of its comparative
advantage, given that poor soil and climate, at least when compared to that of the South and
the Chesapeake regions, limited the production of cash crops such as indigo and tobacco.
Yet the rise of commerce was inhibited for some time by the lack of a viable medium of
exchange. In this study, we examine whether the introduction and subsequent expansion of
paper money by colonial legislatures had quanti￿able e⁄ects on real activity in colonial New
England. The emphasis on the relationship between monetization and growth di⁄ers from
earlier work that tends to focus on adherence to the quantity theory of money, the in￿ ationary
e⁄ects of paper money, and how the New England case typi￿ed its mismanagement (e.g.,
West, 1978; Smith, 1984, 1985; Michener, 1987; Grubb, 2005; O¢ cer, 2005).1
The main hypothesis is simple: by reducing transactions frictions and increasing the
availability of entrepreneurial credit, monetization with paper issues facilitated the emergence
and development of New England￿ s commercial sector. This seems reasonable given the
economic environment that prevailed there in the 18th century. In particular, New England
emerged as a hub for a diverse and sophisticated network of non-agricultural (i.e., modern)
industries such as processing, trade, distribution and marketing, as well as a variety of small-
scale production activities. Such activities required a widely-accepted, readily-available and
storable medium of exchange.
While book credit and barter could be useful for local transactions, a lower-cost method
of exchange was needed for arms-length trades. Gold or silver coins could have served this
function, but the colonies had been prohibited from minting their own and settlers could
only bring limited quantities of specie across the Atlantic. Further, England￿ s mercantilist
policies tended to drain specie from the colonies ￿so much so that coins were driven from
circulation as early as 1717 (O¢ cer, 2005, p. 115). At a time when specie was scarce or
non-existent, issues of paper money were able to encourage trade and commerce.
We show that paper money emissions had measurable long-run e⁄ects on modern sector
activity using the tools of modern macroeconomics. In particular, estimates from a set of
vector error correction models (VECMs) and the associated impulse responses show that
money played a leading role in commerce and not the other way around. Our methodology
allows for separate identi￿cation of short and long-run e⁄ects, and we ￿nd the e⁄ect of
monetization on real activity to be particularly potent in the long-run. This is consistent
with monetization stimulating growth and not just temporary increases in spending. We also
￿nd that direct money issues by the colonial legislatures, used primarily to ￿nance ongoing
military con￿ icts, had stronger real e⁄ects than indirect emissions through loan banks. This
might be expected given that the former were more likely to represent exogenous shocks to
1Our views are conistent with Lester (1938, 1939), who recognized the negative e⁄ects
of monetary expansion in the British North American colonies but admitted the possibility
that, in addition to in￿ ation, monetary expansion had positive real e⁄ects.
1the money supply.
Section 2 reviews the economic environment in colonial New England and describes key
moments in its history of paper money. In Section 3 we discuss the data and framework
for estimation. We test for a link between money and real outcomes in Section 4. Section
5 compares the e⁄ects of paper money emitted through seigniorage and land banks, and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Historical Background
Not long after establishing the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629, New England colonists
discovered that their climate was not well suited to large-scale farming.2 Some manufacturing
did emerge during the 17th century but was for the most part unsuccessful due to high ￿xed
costs and a lack of skilled labor (McCusker and Menard, 1985 p. 97). When a dramatic
fall in immigration during the 1640s led to plummeting prices, bankruptcies and foreclosures
(Canny, 1994, p. 41), provincial leaders tried to legislate recovery by providing tax breaks,
monopoly rights and subsidies to preferred industries, but these interventions did not have the
desired e⁄ects.3 Moreover, many of the non-agricultural sectors that eventually did succeed
required technologically advanced inputs from England, and poor infrastructure initially
hampered distribution of these inputs to interior towns such as Greenwich and New Salem.4
Despite the di¢ culties faced by some sectors, infrastructure improvements initiated by
New England legislatures in the 1640s and 1650s, such as quality controls, inspections and,
2See Middleton (2002, p. 89). The lack of fertile soil prompted Sir Francis Brewster
in 1654 to call New England ￿that unpro￿table plantation, which now brings nothing to
this nation, but to the contrary buries numbers of industrious people in a wilderness, that
produceth nothing but provisions to feed them￿(Brewster, 1964, p. 88). In 1691 William
Petty argued that New England was a hopeless terrain and that the best option was to
relocate New England settlers from their ￿unpro￿table￿economy to more prosperous regions
(Andrews,1938, vol. 4., pp. 338-9).
3 For example, in 1741 Boston￿ s General Court set out to develop ironworks (Woodman,
1975). The implementation was carried out by John Winthrop Jr., who made several at-
tempts at Braintree, Massachusetts in 1641 and later near the town of Lynn in 1646, but a
lack of skilled labor led to the project￿ s failure. Cases such as this one demonstrated that iron
smelting was best kept limited to small-scale bloomaries that produced mostly elementary
tools (Middleton, 2002, p. 90).
4For example, rum could not be re￿ned without mechanical equipment imported from
Britain, and New England￿ s nascent processing sector relied on British machinery such as
crankshafts, gears, cogs, axles, hammers, nails, ￿les, chisels, knives and plows (Middleton,
2002).
2most importantly, the construction of road and bridge networks, began to facilitate arm￿ s
length market interactions among interior townships and between townships and the coastal
merchants who provided British wares.5 Inland traders quickly exploited these networks
to trade, in exchange for household surpluses, the advanced products that were necessary
for diverse small-scale manufacturing and processing industries such as rum distilling, iron
smelting and molasses production. The existence of these trading networks promoted the
expansion of industries around New England￿ s older export sectors. For example, ￿shing
and grain trade required caskmaking, shipping, and middlemen services, while metal bands,
produced by ironworks, were required for caskmaking. Shipbuilding required timber and
milling, and development of the latter led to cheaper inputs for caskmakers. Production
diversity led to development of the required preparation and packing warehouses, as well as
accounting and insurance functions for traders and merchants (Middleton, 2002, p. 208).
As a result, New England settlers soon became pro￿cient in providing transportation,
storage, distribution and mercantile services. This once again re￿ ected their comparative
advantage. Unlike the South￿ s homogenous plantation exports, which were simple to manage
and naturally outsourced to Dutch, English, Scottish and later New England merchants, the
diverse production and processing industries that emerged in the northern colonies by the
late 17th century required sophisticated complementary functions. New England increasingly
provided these functions for herself, the southern and middle colonies, and the Caribbean.
By the 1750s, New England was the New World￿ s center for processing, transportation,
storage, distribution, marketing and mercantile services, with the areas around Boston and
Newport having over 100 distilleries and rum re￿neries. By the 1770s, there were more
active sugar re￿neries and rum distilleries in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island
than in the other ten colonies combined (McCusker, 1970, pp. 431-437; McCusker and
Menard, 1985, pp. 290-293). New Yorkers even complained that their wheat was purchased
by Boston traders, processed in Massachusetts, and sold back to New Yorkers at a pro￿t
(Newell, 1998, p. 69). Yet instead of being monopolized by Boston merchants, the majority of
New Englanders managed to participate in some aspect of the market system. The region￿ s
economic development was su¢ ciently pronounced that English merchants soon became
concerned about competition from the Northern economy: ￿[New England] is already the
rival and supplantress of her mother￿(A Comparison Between the British Sugar Colonies
and New England, 1732, pp. 8-9).
New England￿ s diverse production mix and complex trading system required a viable
transactions medium, such as specie. Specie was easier to carry than more bulky goods,
stable in value, and widely accepted, yet the crown for the most part banned the export of
specie and bullion to the colonies. This meant that coins were in short supply, especially
outside of Boston, and this increased transactions costs (Nettles, 1934, pp. 125-126, 138-141).
5Connecticut and Massachusetts general courts, for instance, disposed funds to complete
inter-town infrastructure and large projects like the Hampton ferry and a bridge across the
Saugus river near Lynn. Various towns also required inhabitants to construct local roads
and bridges collectively (Newell, 1998, p. 55).
3Without ample specie for day-to-day transactions, merchants, traders and producers used
a variety of substitutes for money such as barter, shop notes, book credit and commodity
monies. Trade within towns was often coordinated by shopkeepers who, in addition to sup-
plying ￿nished goods, also kept transactions records for the residents.6 Barter was common in
exchange between towns and country traders. The latter often traveled extensively to supply
creditors with speci￿c products and would often travel to multiple destinations before ￿nding
the desired matches. For example, an inland trader might take furs from Lancaster, credit a
seller￿ s account, carry the furs (and other goods) to the Atlantic, exchange them for British
imports in Boston, and ￿nally travel back to Lancaster (trading along the way) where the
original seller would take goods equal in value to his credit. All of this involved risk because
traders might not survive the return journey or acquire suitable goods in exchange.7
The introduction of paper money relaxed these bartering constraints, even though the
￿rst and many subsequent issues were enacted to ￿nance government expenditures, espe-
cially military con￿ icts during wartime. Indeed, the Massachusetts legislature approved the
￿rst colonial paper money issue in 1690 to ￿nance a failed military expedition against New-
foundland. These tax anticipation bills were not printed for use as transactions media, but
rather as a way to defer payment to the militia. The initial plan was to levy a special tax
the next year that could be paid in real goods, specie or tax bills, but by the time tax
season approached, the bills had become circulating currency and were ￿better than money￿
(Hutchinson, 1936, Vol. 1, pp. 340-341).
The popularity of these tax bills (or ￿tenor￿as they were called) led to the ￿rst peacetime
emission in 1702, and in 1709 the Hartford government issued Connecticut bills to combat
the ￿great scarcity of money￿and, conveniently, to ￿nance an expedition against the French
(Hutchinson, 1936, Vol. 2, p. 289). New Hampshire also issued their own bills, followed
by Rhode Island in 1710. The tenor of all four colonies circulated at par with one another,
crossed borders freely within New England, and in 1712 became legal tender for public and
private debts. While bills were ostensibly redeemable at future dates, tax levies were not
commensurate with emissions and the supply of bills in circulation increased throughout the
￿rst half of the 18th century.
There were two ways in which paper money got into circulation. First, seigniorage
emissions were printed directly to ￿nance government debts, the bulk of which were related
to military expeditions but could also be used for government salaries, infrastructure projects,
fort repairs and day-to-day administrative expenses. The second method of emission was
6For example, shopkeepers kept records of day or half-day labor owed by one settler to
another. Also common was the ￿ truck￿system, in which laborers were paid in commodities
or shop credits.
7For example, Thomas Fitch, a wealthy Boston merchant, purchased imports with a va-
riety of goods brought from the west. Fitch often advanced goods to traders on credit and
required speci￿c products in return. For example, in 1703 he provided nails to a country
trader who agreed in return to deliver ￿Turpentine in August or Septem. next.￿ (from
Thomas Fitch Letterbook, cited in Newell (1998, p. 91).
4through ￿ land banks.￿ Under this system legislatures disbursed bills to town leaders who
selected citizens to whom the bills would be loaned, using land as collateral. To the extent
that land bills were based on underlying assets, they did not increase the money supply
permanently, but Smith (1985, pp 549-551) argues that they were only imperfectly tied to
underlying asset values and therefore may have had more permanent e⁄ects.
New England￿ s money supply increased dramatically over the period 1703-1749, even
after accounting for currency depreciation. As Table 1 shows, there were £112,800 old tenor
outstanding in 1710. By 1749 the outstanding total of £4,033,700 implied a cumulative
increase of 3,475 percent! Of special interest is the fact that while this paper money did lose
value, it only depreciated by 694 percent over the period. Most of this depreciation occurred
between 1745 and 1749 when colonies printed large amounts of money to fund the Louisburg
expedition during the War of Jenkin￿ s Ear. This incomplete price adjustment implies that
paper money emissions let to increases in the real money stock.
Loan bank and treasury-issued paper money was hotly debated by contemporaries. Anec-
dotal evidence described in Brock (1975, 1992) shows prolonged and intense discussions re-
garding the relative costs and merits of the New England monetary experiments. With
regard to the currency debate, detractors, many of whom were creditors (i.e., Boston mer-
chants) emphasized the consequences of currency devaluation, while supporters argued that
transactions media stimulated trade and commerce and that existing money stocks were not
su¢ cient to support the region￿ s growing economy.
It is well known that New England paper money often depreciated rapidly, especially
after 1740. The New England colonies, and Rhode Island in particular, are often held up as
classic examples of overissuance. While not disputing that the issues were often in￿ ationary,
we believe that the existing discussion, by focusing primarily on the costs of in￿ ation, ignores
an important dimension of paper money issues: monetization. In a world with better data,
one would ideally like to estimate the relative in￿ ationary costs and monetization bene￿ts
of colonial paper money. In absence of comprehensive economic data, however, we take the
more modest approach of investigating whether increases in the real money stock and paper
money stimulated economic activity. The next section sets out the quantitative framework
that we use to do this.
3. Framework For Estimation
Our analysis begins with the well-known quantity theory of money
MV = PY; (1)
where M is the money supply, V is the velocity of money, or the number of times that a
typical single currency unit is used over some ￿xed period of time, P is the price level and
Y is a measure of real economic activity. Because V is not observable, assuming it to be
constant over time is adequate to make (1) estimable. This approach, as adopted by West
5(1978) after also assuming constancy of Y and taking logs, generates the usual empirical test
of the quantity theory
ln(P) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(M) + ￿2 ln(Y ) + "; (2)
where a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on ￿1 is typically viewed as evidence that increases
in nominal money are re￿ ected in higher prices. Our empirical analysis involves relaxing the
assumption of a constant Y as described in Rousseau (2006, 2007, 2010). In that formulation,
the release of pent-up demand for a low-cost transactions medium draws more transactions
into the modern sector of an economy and has an additional positive spillover on that sector￿ s
production. Still assuming constant velocity, rearrangement of the quantity theory thus







We aim to develop an empirical representation of this equation that allows for both the
possibility that M
P determines Y and also that Y determines M
P : One way to test for long-
run comovement among these variables is to use the cointegration framework developed in
Johansen (1991). If a pair of nonstationary variables are cointegrated, this means that there
exists a linear combination of them that is stationary. Engle and Granger (1987) further show
that there would be a valid ￿error correction￿mechanism through which the variables are
related. This vector error correction model (VECM) is formed by embedding the stationary
linear combination in an otherwise standard vector autoregression in ￿rst di⁄erences. For
an underlying vector autoregression (VAR) with k lags, the VECM takes the form


















































Note that if Y and M
P have unit roots and are cointegrated, all of the terms in the re-
gression are stationary, including the residuals "1;t and "2;t. Consider equation (4), which















. The lag di⁄erences capture short-run adjustments





: The cointegrating combination (i.e., [a,b]0) represents
the long-run equilibrium relationship. When used with the data to form the linear combina-
tion, the coe¢ cient on this error correction term, ￿1, gives the speed at which 4Y adjusts to
perturbations in the long-run relationship. With a normalized to unity, the signs of b and ￿
6allow the investigator to deduce the direction of any long-run e⁄ect of ￿ uctuations in money
on Y:
To see how estimated coe¢ cients indicate the direction of causation, consider the case
where none of the short-run parameters are signi￿cant and ￿1 and ￿2 are both signi￿cant.
This would imply that M
P causes Y in a long-run sense and vice versa. In this case the model
cannot disentangle the direction of causation.
Suppose, however, that ￿1 is statistically signi￿cant but ￿2 is not. This would indicate
that Y responds to ￿ uctuations in the equilibrium relationship between M
P and Y , but that M
P
does not. If b and ￿1 were both negative, this would imply that depressions in the equilibrium
relationship generated by increases in M
P would force the dependent variable, Y , upward. An
econometrician would say that M
P is ￿weakly exogenous for Y ,￿meaning that M
P causes Y
in a long-run statistical sense.
Since a VECM is an algebraic re-formulation of a standard VAR in levels, stability of
the VECM implies that we can gain information about the overall adjustment process by
estimating the underlying VAR and calculating the associated impulse responses. The VAR
takes the form




























Since the VAR does not involve transformation into error-correction format, the coe¢ cients
on the regressors in levels allow the investigator to trace out the overall e⁄ects (i.e., combining
the short and long-run) of Y to shocks in M
P and of M
P to shocks in Y with impulse response
functions.
4. Data
We begin with a measure of New England￿ s money supply constructed from various
sources. This includes treasury-issued and land bank tenor (bills of credit), privately-issued
merchants￿notes, and the stock of specie.
The amounts of paper money in circulation for each of the four New England colonies
(i.e., Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island) are the cumulative
sum of issues less any retirements from Carter et al. (2006, Vol. 5, Series Eg302-Eg305, pp.
692-3, Historical Statistics hereafter).8
8The data in Historical Statistics are corrected and re￿ned versions of series that appear
in Brock (1975).
7Table 1
Components of the Real Money Supply and Y , New England 1703-1749.
Seigniorage Land Bank Private Silver in Money Price Imports in
Notes Notes Notes Circulation Supply Level 1700-02
Year £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor (1703=1) £ Sterling
1703 6,400 0 0 173,848 180,248 1 59,608
1704 17,700 0 0 167,834 185,534 0.980 74,896
1705 29,500 0 0 160,329 189,829 0.946 62,504
1706 31,100 0 0 153,798 184,898 0.064 57,050
1707 40,800 0 0 144,399 185,199 1.093 120,630
1708 57,000 0 0 130,725 187,725 1.066 115,505
1709 69,400 0 0 114,802 184,202 1.146 120,349
1710 112,800 0 0 96,414 209,214 1.158 106,338
1711 92,900 50,000 0 83,337 226,237 1.053 137,421
1712 188,900 25,000 0 70,260 284,160 1.131 128,105
1713 219,500 0 0 57,676 277,176 1.281 120,778
1714 146,400 50,000 0 45,092 241,492 1.383 121,288
1715 174,500 80,000 0 32,508 287,008 1.166 164,650
1716 71,000 170,000 0 19,925 260,925 1.126 121,156
1717 135,800 175,000 0 7,340 318,140 1.212 132,001
1718 145,300 163,500 0 0 308,800 1.358 131,885
1719 138,500 152,000 0 0 290,500 1.377 125,317
1720 126,300 150,500 0 0 276,800 1.256 128,767
1721 68,600 239,000 0 0 307,600 1.223 114,523
1722 126,000 237,500 0 0 363,500 1.321 133,722
1723 150,700 236,000 0 0 386,700 1.340 176,486
1724 181,200 234,500 0 0 415,700 1.432 168,507
1725 213,400 233,000 0 0 446,400 1.501 201,768
1726 266,400 211,500 0 0 477,900 1.713 200,882
1727 269,800 190,000 0 0 459,800 1.654 187,277
1728 256,400 266,000 0 0 522,400 1.647 194,589
1729 265,300 242,000 0 0 507,300 1.852 161,102
1730 277,000 218,000 0 0 495,000 1.886 208,196
1731 285800 260,000 0 0 545,800 1.648 183,466
1732 290,000 242,000 0 0 532,000 1.793 216,600
1733 284,750 375,250 14,904 0 674,904 1.948 184,570
1734 483,600 346,000 122,906 0 952,506 2.119 146,460
1735 495,550 316,750 144,145 0 956,445 2.457 189,125
1736 529,700 297,500 46,341 0 873,541 2.495 222,158
1737 518,300 282,700 31,073 0 832,073 2.763 223,923
1738 454,000 359,000 33,613 0 846,613 2.537 203,233
8Table 1, continued.
Components of the Real Money Supply and Y , New England 1703-1749.
Seigniorage Land Bank Private Silver in Money Price Imports in
Notes Notes Notes Circulation Supply Level 1700-02
Year £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor £ Tenor (1703=1) £ Sterling
1739 562,700 329,600 32,221 0 924,521 2.379 220,378
1740 459,300 472,900 19,555 0 951,755 2.775 171,081
1741 587,981 458,818 186,837 0 1,233,637 3.535 198,146
1742 526,063 544,736 92,811 0 1,163,611 3.341 148,899
1743 626,045 510,655 19,555 0 1,156,255 3.126 172,461
1744 775,627 636,573 0 0 1,412,200 3.006 143,982
1745 1,430,809 602,491 0 0 2,033,300 3.590 140,463
1746 2,698,591 568,409 0 0 3,267,000 4.663 209,177
1747 3,319,772 534,327 0 0 3,854,100 6.165 210,640
1748 3,540,554 494,245 0 0 4,034,800 8.580 197,682
1749 3,589,536 444,164 0 0 4,033,700 8.129 238,286
Note. Seigniorage and land bank bills are from Historical Statistics Series Eg302-Eg305
and Brock (1975, pp 23, 26, 38, 44-45, 47-49). See Section 4 of text for details on
construction. Private notes and silver in circulation are from O¢ cer (2005, pp. 114-117).
The money supply is the sum of seignorage, land bank and private notes, and silver in
circulation. See Section 4 for derivation of our price level index from wheat and molasses
prices from Cole (1938, Table 36, p. 117) as well as cod￿sh prices from Historical
Statistics (Vol. 5, Series Eg248, p. 675). Imports from England (in constant 1700-02
sterling) are from Historical Statistics (Vol. 5, Series Eg437, pp. 710-11).
The paper money component is constructed from data on bills issued by treasuries (here-
after ￿seigniorage￿ ) and those issued on loan through land banks. Later we will examine, in
addition to the e⁄ect of the total real money supply on Y , the relative e⁄ects of these two
components. We obtain the loan bank component by using, for every instance in which a
colonial legislature approved a loan bank emission, the value of paper money emitted and
the pre-speci￿ed redemption schedule to calculate the balance outstanding for each year.
The underlying accounts of loan bank issues are from Brock (1975, pp 23, 26, 38, 44-45,
47-49). Seigniorage bills are obtained by subtracting the outstanding loan bank stock from
the total paper money stock. Since the paper money of the New England colonies circulated
at par across their boundaries, the total paper money stock for the region is the sum of the
outstanding balances for the four colonies.
For privately-issued notes, we use the series compiled by O¢ cer (2005, pp. 114-16). These
include Boston Merchant￿ s notes, New London Society notes, New Hampshire Merchant￿ s
notes, Silver Bank notes, and notes of the Massachusetts-chartered private ￿Land Bank.￿
No comprehensive measure of specie exists for the period, but O¢ cer (2005, pp. 116-17)
constructs a reasonable proxy in Massachusetts tenor equivalents from the existing fragmen-
9tary sources, and we use his estimates here.9 The total money stock and its components are
given in Table 1.
To convert the nominal stock of paper money into real terms, we need a measure of P:
This presents a challenge because there is no comprehensive price measure for New England
over the period. One approach, taken by McCallum (1992) and Smith (1985), assumes that
sterling prices are stable and uses the exchange rate to convert tenor to sterling values.
We prefer to measure the price level using real goods actually traded in Massachusetts,
and build a new index to do so. There are only three available price series for the period:
the prices of a bushel of wheat (1703-1749) and a gallon of molasses (1720-1749) from Cole,
(1938, Table 36, p. 117), and a hundredweight of merchantable cod￿sh (1703-1749) from
Historical Statistics (Vol. 5, Series Eg248, p. 675). Since molasses prices begin in 1720, we
use an AR(1) model to backcast them to 1703. The constructed index, presented in Table
1, averages the resulting series after normalizing each good￿ s price to unity in 1703.10
Since we test for an e⁄ect of monetization on the level of activity in the modern sector, it
is not obvious that the ideal measure of Y would be gross domestic product, given its large
agricultural component, even if it were available (Rousseau and Sylla, 2005, p. 11). On the
other hand, modern sector activity might be well-proxied by a measure of commerce, and
imports from England in constant 1700-1702 sterling are available for the period of our study
from Historical Statistics (Vol. 5, Series Eg437, pp. 710-11).11 These data were compiled
under supervision under the British Inspector General and are presented in the ￿nal column
of Table 1. This series is su¢ ciently comprehensive because the majority of New England
trade occurred between Boston and London, rather than with Southern Europe, the East
Indies, South America or other British colonies (McCusker, 1978).
We believe that the imports series contains important information about development in
the modern sector, which should lead to increased income and consumption. Additionally,
9O¢ cer￿ s underlying sources include a direct estimate of £200,000 at the end of 1699 from
Davis (1900). There are also two estimates of the relative amounts of specie to bills. Brock
(1992, p. 7) states that: ￿in 1710 there was perhaps as much silver in circulation as there
were bills.￿Davis (1911, vol. 4, p. 157) cites an anecdotal account from 1743 which places
bills in circulation at three times silver balances in 1712. The ￿nal observation is a generally-
accepted estimate of 1717 as the date at which no specie remained in circulation. O¢ cer
then measures the amount of specie in circulation by linearly interpolating these points using
the trade de￿cit as a weighting factor.
10To proxy price variation, West (1978) uses only wheat prices. To this O¢ cer (2005) adds
molasses prices after 1720. This provides more accurate price information after 1720 but
does not treat the years before and after 1720 symmetrically.
11Exports from New England are a less satisfactory proxy because they were in￿ uenced
heavily by Navigation Laws, especially after 1740, and this series aggregates both New
England exports with re-exports from the Caribbean and other colonies.
10a developed modern sector requires more inward investment, which increases income, again
allowing for more consumption. Further, the fact that many purchased imports were neces-
sary inputs for modern production, they would have generated another positive spillover on
economic activity.
5. Results
Before proceeding with the time-series analysis, we ￿rst check the stationarity properties
of real money and Y . The ￿rst column of Table 2 presents Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
statistics for these series, which fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in all cases. We
therefore go on to test for a cointegrating relationship between the two series. The Johansen
(1991) statistics for the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests presented in the right panel
of the table indicate that at least one of the tests is consistent with a single cointegrating
relationship between Y and each component of M
P .
Table 2
Unit Root and Cointegration Tests for M
P and Y.
Dickey-Fuller Test Johansen Test
Maximum
ADF Trace eigenvalue
Statistic ￿ 0 ￿ 1 ￿ 0 ￿ 1
Y 0.941
M
P 0.996 11.601* 2.153 9.448* 2.150
S
P 1.594 8.665* 2.033 6.632 2.033
LB
P -0.559 9.029* 0.360 8.668 0.360
Note. The left panel gives Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the null
hypothesis of unit root using a speci￿cation with a constant, a time
trend and two additional lag di⁄erences of the dependent variable.
The second panel presents test statistics for Johansen tests of a
cointegrating link between the row series and Y . The column labeled
￿ 0 tests the null of no cointegration while the row labeled ￿ 1 tests
the null of at most one cointegrating vector. The Johansen test uses
three lags for the underlying VAR, and includes an unrestricted intercept.
Critical values are from Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum (1992). An *
denotes statistical signi￿cance at the 10% level or less.
11By inserting the cointegrating vector that emerges from the Johansen procedure into
equations (4) and (5), we can then form a VECM to identify any short and long-run e⁄ects
that are present. The order of the underlying levels VAR is k = 3, as chosen by a series of
nested likelihood ratio tests, so the corresponding VECM will use k ￿ 1 = 2 ￿rst di⁄erences
of the data.
Our main result is presented in the ￿rst two columns of Table 3, labeled ￿Total Money
Supply,￿ which present estimation results from equations (4) and (5). The ECT in the
money equation is not signi￿cant, consistent with the absence of a long-run causal channel
from Y to M
P : On the other hand, the ECT in the Y equation is signi￿cant with a negative
sign. When combined with the negative estimate of b in the cointegrating vector from the
Johansen test (presented in the ￿nal row of Table 3) this implies a strong positive response of
Y to long-run ￿ uctuations in the money supply. Signi￿cance of the ECT in the Y equation
along with absence of signi￿cance in the money equation suggests that direction of long-run
causality is from money to output and not the other way around. The positive e⁄ect of
money on Y is not evident in the VECM￿ s short-run parameters. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that monetization stimulated long-term development of the modern sector rather
than only immediate spending. In all cases the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest that the
residuals are not serially correlated.
We now quantify the dynamics of this adjustment. In particular, we would like to know if
money had caused a discrete increase in Y at some speci￿c horizon, or if the e⁄ect cumulated
gradually. Because VECM estimates are stable by construction, we can exploit the fact that
the VECM is a re-formulation of a standard VAR in levels. In other words, stationary and
serially uncorrelated errors in a VECM imply that the corresponding VAR in levels will also
be stationary. Our strategy for assessing adjustment dynamics is thus to estimate equations
(6) and (7) and use the coe¢ cients to construct response functions of each variable to a one
standard-deviation shock to the other.
Panel 1 of Table 4 presents estimates for equations (6) and (7). The ￿rst two rows present
the individual coe¢ cient estimates. Centered below these are block exogeneity tests of the
null hypothesis that lags 1-3 of a given variable (i.e., Y or M
P ) are jointly zero. The results
are consistent with those found in the VECM: real money balances cause Y but not the
other way around.
The upper panel of Fig. 1 shows the corresponding impulse response functions along
with 90% con￿dence bands. The ￿gure on the left plots the percentage change in Y over
time to a one standard deviation shock to M
P . The e⁄ect becomes statistically signi￿cant
after two years and persists until fourteen years from the initial shock. On the right we
plot the response of M
P to a one standard deviation shock to Y: Here, the e⁄ect is not
signi￿cant, again con￿rming that money drives Y but not the other way around. Overall,
results from the VECM, VAR and impulse responses provide strong evidence that New
England￿ s monetization led to permanent increases in economic activity.
We now examine the e⁄ect of paper money emitted through each of New England￿ s two
monetary mechanisms: bills emitted for seigniorage by the treasuries and bills authorized
12Table 3
Estimates from Vector Error Correction Models, New England, 1703-1749.

















ECTt￿1 -0.436*** 0.074 -0.563*** -0.168 -0.021* -0.352**
(0.123) (0.104) (0.167) (0.292) (0.011) (0.139)
4Yt￿1 -0.186 -0.178 -0.108 0.032 -0.413*** -0.565
(0.145) (0.123) (0.167) (0.293) (0.151) (1.836)
4Yt￿2 -0.115 -0.220* -0.056 -0.031 -0.197 -2.419
(0.133) (0.113) (0.150) (0.263) (0.149) (1.817)
4(M












P )t￿1 0.008 -0.387***
(0.011) (0.134)
4(LB
P )t￿2 -0.015 -0.444***
(0.011) (0.132)
R2 0.422 0.186 0.375 0.154 0.293 0.438
Durbin-Watson 2.148 2.069 1.932 1.964 2.111 2.118
Coint loading [a, b] [1, -0.583] [1, -0.276] [1, 0.531 ]
Note. All variables are in log levels. The ￿rst two columns report coe¢ cients from estimating
equations (4) and (5) using the entire New England money supply expressed in terms of constant
tenor. The third and fourth columns report coe¢ cients from estimating equations (4) and (5)
using only seigniorage or land bank bills. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statististical stigni￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Panel 1: Total Money Supply
Y 0.379*** 0.070 0.118 -0.179 0.427* -0.017 0.70
(0.142) (0.144) (0.124) (0.168) (0.237) (0.195)
Granger test 24.35 9.311
P-value (0.000) (0.025)
M
P -0.0978 -0.044 0.229** 0.908*** -0.235 0.222 0.87
(0.120) (0.121) (0.105) (0.142) (0.200) (0.164)
Granger test 5.605 101.92
P-value (0.132) (0.000)
Panel 2: Seignorage Bills
Y 0.332** 0.053 0.059 -0.007 0.090 0.063 0.67
(0.152) (0.156) (0.141) (0.088) (0.104) (0.086)
Granger test 7.56 5.221
P-value (0.006) (0.156)
S
P -0.0878 -0.030 0.091 0.619*** 0.330* -0.057 0.82
(0.258) (0.265) (0.239) (0.150) (0.177) (0.146)
Granger test 0.249 60.50
P-value (0.969) (0.000)
Panel 3: Loan Bank Bills
Y 0.457*** 0.121 0.079 0.004 -0.017 0.020** 0.67
(0.141) (0.152) (0.140) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Granger test 23.53 5.018
P-value (0.000) (0.170)
LB
P 0.120 -0.948 3.53** 0.355*** -0.109 0.383*** 0.76
(1.761) (1.891) (1.742) (0.128) (0.140) (0.123)
Granger test 5.074 26.99
P value (0.166) (0.000)
Note. The table includes results for two-variable VARs with three lags. The rows for
panels 1 and 2 correspond to equations (6) and (7). The dependent variable for each
equation is listed in the left column. Coe¢ cient estimates appear in the columns for
the independent variables, given by the column labels, with standard errors in
parentheses. The rows labeled ￿Granger test￿report block Wald statistics and the
rows labeled ￿P-value￿report corresponding tail probabilities for the null hypothesis
that the lags of each system variable are jointly zero. All variables are in log levels.
*, ** and *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.Fig. 1. Impulse Response Functions, New England, 1703-1749.
E⁄ect of M
P on Y E⁄ect of Y on M
P
Panel 1: Total Money Stock
Panel 2: Seigniorage Bills
Panel 3: Loan Bank Bills
Note: These ￿gures plot annual responses to a one standard deviation shock,
constructed from parameters estimated in vector autoregrerssions with three
lags. The dashed lines are 90% con￿dence bands.
15by legislatures to be loaned on collateral to colonists. We denote these two series by S
and LB, respectively. Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 present estimates from equations
(6) and (7). Results for the seigniorage system are similar to those for the total money
stock. The ￿nal two columns of Table 3 report results for paper money emitted through
land banks. Here, the ECT is signi￿cant in the LB
P equation, suggesting that legislatures
may have emitted loan bank bills in response to output. The sign of this e⁄ect, a￿2 =(-
0.352)(0.531)=-0.189 is negative, indicating that decreases in output led to future increases
in loan bank emissions. This may be because economic downturns led colonists to pressure
legislatures for new emissions. Turning to the Y equation, the ECT is weakly signi￿cant and
the estimated e⁄ect of land bank money on Y is small and negative. This suggests that the
timing of loan bank emissions may not have been conducive to modern sector development.
The associated VARs in Table 4 bear out these ￿ndings. Panel 2 shows that seigniorage
bills weakly Granger cause Y at the 16% level, but Panel 3 indicates bi-directional causality
between loan bank emissions and Y . The corresponding impulse response functions in Fig.
1 show a protracted e⁄ect of seigniorage issues on Y that begins by the third year after
emission and continues through the eleventh year. Moreover, there is no measurable e⁄ect of
Y on the timing of seigniorage emissions. This is similar to our ￿ndings for the entire money
stock.
By comparing Panel 1 with Panel 2 of Fig. 1, we can see that the e⁄ect of shocks to
the full money stock had a larger and more protracted e⁄ect on Y than did seigniorage
issues. This is consistent with the view that paper money, while e⁄ective in monetizing the
region, may not have been as e⁄ective as specie, the latter not being subject to in￿ ation
costs and being more widely accepted outside the region. The impulse responses for land
bank emissions in the lower panel of Fig. 1 indicate no measurable e⁄ect of loan bank bills
on Y at all but repeated and long-term e⁄ects of Y on real loan bank balances.
Overall, these results indicate a positive and meaningful e⁄ect of New England￿ s mone-
tization on modern sector activity.12
6. Conclusion
At the broadest level, our study o⁄ers support for the proposition that, in addition
to causing currency depreciation, New England￿ s monetization facilitated emergence of a
modern economic sector. While the large-scale production of staple crops may involve fewer
transactions requiring currency, availability of a viable transactions medium to carry out a
wide range of arms-length transactions is central to a modern economy￿ s e⁄ectiveness. To the
12The main results are qualitatively similar when we repeat our empirical analysis con-
verting tenor value to pound sterling equivalents using the exchange rate, which assumes
constant British prices, or when we use a domestic price index that includes only wheat and
cod￿sh prices. These ￿ndings are available from the authors upon request.
16extent that imports re￿ ect such activity, our estimates provide quanti￿able historic evidence
on the importance of a widely-accepted medium of exchange, namely ￿at paper money.
In particular, using data on money, prices, and imports from England, a series of vec-
tor error correction models and the associated impulse responses indicate that monetary
expansions had positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects on economic activity that were
strongest in the long run. The presence of such e⁄ects suggest that money promoted New
England￿ s diverse trade and processing sector rather than supporting only temporary in-
creases in spending.
We next show that paper money issues aimed at funding government expenditures fol-
lowed a similar pattern, a⁄ecting modern sector development but not being a⁄ected by it.
On the other hand, paper money issued as loans against land did not have a measurable
e⁄ect on New England￿ s modern sector. The latter result may arise because land bank issues
were often enacted by legislatures under pressure from citizens, so that this form of money
may have grown in response to anticipated demand shocks. Alternatively, to the extent that
loans were temporary (i.e., were paid back according to a set schedule), land bank issues
may not be a good example of permanent changes in the money supply.
Our primary contribution is to use widely-available data on money, output and prices to
show that New England￿ s experiments with paper money in the colonial period in￿ uenced
output in a quantitatively meaningful way. Previous scholars have focused on the e⁄ects of
money emissions on the extent and speed of devaluation. By departing from this literature
to answer a broader question about the relationship between monetization and economic
development, we conclude that it is important to consider the bene￿ts of ￿at paper money
in addition to the costs when evaluating those monetary regimes that employed it.
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